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D i v i n e  S u r g e o n s  a t  W o r k :
T h e  P r e s e n c e  a n d  
P u r p o s e o f  t h e  D r e a m  
V is i o n  in T i l l  W e  H a v e  F a c e s
E r i n  K .  W a g n e r
M e tam o rp h o ses, w ritten  b y  A p u le iu s  in  th e  seco n d  cen tu ry  and the 
source text for C.S. Lew is's Till We Have Faces, features such a large 
num ber of dream s and visions w ithin its pages that the dream  elem ent 
perm eates the entire narrative, defining its tone and purpose. Vered Lev Kenaan 
explains the presence of dream ing w ithin the novel as its basic structure (251) 
and James Gollnick, author of The Religious Dreamworld of Apuleius' 
M etam orphoses, also notes the im portance of this pervasive feature, explaining 
that the dream s enable A puleius to m ake sense of contradictions w ithin his novel 
(2). Lewis, though in some ways eager to distance him self from  A puleius, draw s 
on the dream -like atm osphere of Metamorphoses for his ow n purposes in retelling 
the C upid and Psyche m yth .1 W ithin the novel, he creates a lim inal space 
w herein reality and im agination are no t so easily separated and im agination thus 
takes on a m ore concrete presence, overshadow ing and redefining the nature of 
reality. As such, the nature of dream s as tru th-bearers is forefronted and through 
doing so, Lewis also m akes an argum ent about the respective roles of faith and 
reason, using lim inality to discuss the necessary convergence of these two 
processes. Convergence, which seems to be the necessary partner to 
fragm entation in this novel, provides healing to the broken narrator, Orual.
Lewis calls upon  a m ixed tradition of antique and m edieval sources 
concerning dream s and visions to inform  his novel. In antiquity, especially in 
extant Greek texts and sources, the role of the dream  as prophetic, and therefore 
a source of truth, w as heavily debated and discussed. Some of the m ost notable 
philosophers, Aristotle and Cicero am ong them, thought the opinion tha t dream s 
w ere revelatory was ridiculous (Miller 32-33). Similarly, Plato regarded the 
dream  to be shaped by w hatever p a rt of the psyche w as m ost active rather than
1 In his afterword to T ill W e  H a ve  Faces, Lewis expresses a distaste for other elements of 
Apuleius's work: "Nothing was further from my aim than to recapture the peculiar quality 
of the M etam orphoses—that strange compound of picaresque novel, horror comic, 
mystagogue's tract, pornography, and stylistic experiment" (313).
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by supernatural influence (Meier 305). Despite this, practices like dream  
incubation show that not everyone subscribed to the same view of dream s. Those 
seeking aid from  the gods often slept in tem ples in the hopes of receiving an 
illum inating m essage (Miller 26). The practice of dream  incubation seems to have 
w ithstood both tim e and contrary opinion, lasting th roughout the centuries 
(Meier 303). By such w orshippers as these, dream s w ere always considered to be 
supernatural, even if they were not always trusted  to bring good new s or even 
revelation (Miller 24). As early as the th ird  century, the dream -vision as fictional 
genre h ad  been incorporated into Christian literature (Spearing 13). For m edieval 
authors, the fictional dream -vision w as a genre that linked them  w ith antiquity, 
serving often as an attem pt to reintroduce Platonism  (Lynch 70). As a medieval 
genre therefore intim ately concerned w ith  Platonism  and antique philosophy, 
Lewis w ould  have no doubt found the dream -vision intriguing, as he was both a 
Neo-Platonist and a m edievalist (Wilson 137).
Platonic them es are w idespread th roughout the M eta m o rp h o ses , and, in 
T he D isca rd ed  Im a g e , Lewis highlights the w ay in w hich A puleius transm its these 
Platonic ideas to m edieval readers through his texts (Gollnick 22; D isca rd ed  Im age  
[D isca rd ed] 43). W ithin Platonic philosophy, Lewis explains, hum an and god 
cannot m eet w ithout a bridge (43). Very often, in both classical and medieval 
texts and culture, this bridge came in the form  of a vision or dream , w hether 
purported  to be real, as in the case of Saul and his vision on the road to 
Damascus, or fictional, as in the M e ta m o rp h o se s . D rea m  and v is io n  seem to operate 
as fairly interchangeable term s and concepts as well, serving in the same 
capacities as bridges in these texts—as is perhaps indicated by  their conflation in 
the nam e of the genre d re a m -v is io n . Except, perhaps, in the m ost literal of cases 
like that of Saul, even those visions initially perceived to be w aking very often 
become associated w ith sleep, night, or darkness (Acts 9). Even Saul's vision 
leaves h im  blind and forced to stum ble in night-like conditions. Lewis's ow n 
work, The G rea t D ivo rce , serves as a good exam ple of this am biguity. The novel 
begins in  m ed ias res, w herein our narrator appears to be awake: "I seem ed to be 
standing in a busy queue by the side of a long m ean street. Evening was just 
closing in and it was raining" (1). The hesitancy of the verb seem ed  here and the 
m ention of evening m ight raise suspicions of our narrator's condition, bu t it is 
not m ade clear until the end in which he awakes: "I awoke in a cold room, 
hunched on the floor beside a black and em pty grate, the clock striking three, 
and the siren how ling overhead" (146). The very disjointed nature of such 
visions—unclear un til the end w hether they be real or no, sleeping or w ak ing— 
lends itself to their purpose.
Visions and dream s jar the reader from  com placent reality into a set of 
conditions potentially m ore real. T he G rea t D ivo rce , like so m any of Lew is's texts, 
w orks w ithin the Platonic philosophy of Forms that does in fact overturn a view
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of the w orld  based on sensory perception. Lewis defines the function of symbol 
and allegory w ithin this philosophy in Allegory of Love:
The symbolist leaves that which is given to find that which is more real.
To put the difference in another way, for the symbolist it is we who are the 
allegory. We are the 'frigid personifications'; the heavens above us are the 
'shadowy abstractions'; the world which we mistake for reality is the flat 
outline of that which elsewhere veritably is in all the round of its 
unimaginable dimensions. (45)
If the w aking w orld is a m ere shadow, the dream  can access a spiritual reality as 
well as or better than anything else. This is perhaps w hy Lewis is so fond of the 
genre. In addition to the Great Divorce, Lewis uses the dream -vision in his early 
novel, The Pilgrim's Regress—naturally  enough, since this novel clearly references 
its forebearer, The Pilgrim's Progress, also w ritten as a dream-vision. John Bunyan 
begins Pilgrim's Progress by placing his authorial persona into a dream  in which 
he will see the adventures of Christian and his fellows: "As I w alk 'd th rough the 
w ilderness of this w orld, I lighted on a certain place, w here was a Denn, A nd I 
laid m e dow n in that place to sleep: A nd as I slept, I dream ed a Dream. I 
dream ed, and behold, I saw  a M an cloathed w ith  Rags" (10). Lewis echoes these 
opening lines in his ow n from  The Pilgrim's Regress: "I dream ed of a boy w ho was 
born in the land of Puritania and his nam e was John" (3). N ot only does Lewis 
cleverly play on the nam e of the author of his textual inspiration, he also m akes 
him self the dream er. Clearly, he values the dream  and the dream -vision as a 
m eans by w hich to access truth.
The tru th  w hich Lewis very often tries to access in his w ork is the 
nature of the relationship between faith and reason. A form er atheist, Lewis 
becam e a Christian w ithin an academic setting w hich stressed the 
incom patibility of faith and reason, a stance that A ndrew  W heat explains could 
partly  be attributed to the grow th of science and technology at the beginning of 
the century (21). R esponding to this environm ent, Lewis becam e a vigorous 
defender of religion as a rational and reasoned choice for m en and w om en to 
m ake (21). In his poem, "Reason," Lewis states how  im portant a m arriage of 
these two precepts of faith and reason was to his religious conviction, phrased 
here as im agination and intellect: "O h w ho will reconcile in m e both m aid  and 
m other, /  W ho m ake in m e a concord of the depth  and height? /  W ho m ake 
im agination's dim  exploring touch /  Ever report the same as intellectual sight?" 
(ll. 11-14). Peter Schakel, in his study of Till We Have Faces, tracks Lewis's 
developing ideas th roughout his career concerning how  faith and reason should 
interact. In Lew is's last novel, Schakel argues that Lewis, w ho was once m ore like 
O rual and dependent on reason alone, "w rites to the whole person," rejecting a 
separation of faith and reason as disparate elem ents (x, 162).
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The m edieval dream -vision w as concerned w ith understanding  the 
same relationship. K athryn Lynch describes the genre as one that "pit[ted] 
im agination against reason, image against significance" (Lynch 76). Indeed, m ost 
scholars seem to accept that reason is an expected elem ent w ithin m edieval 
dream  visions. Lynch com ments that these vision narratives are the ultim ate 
"synthesis of reason and revelation," underlined  by  the form  itself, w hich brings 
together poetic and analytical forms (25). The form  is difficult precisely because it 
comes from  a lim inal space, situated between sensory know ledge and reason; 
journeying through this lim inal state changes the travelers, redirecting their life 
(Gunn 134). The purposely  "unintelligible form " requires both the viewer and 
reader of the vision to struggle to grasp its extended knowledge, m aking  the 
acquisition of reason valuable to all (Lynch 31). As M arsha D utton explains, 
referring specifically to the visions of Julian of Norwich, the fourteenth-century 
mystic, any know ledge gained through personal revelation m ust eventually be 
re-understood th rough the lens of rationality (113).
In Till We Have Faces, I argue that Lewis is draw ing on the specific 
concerns of the m edieval dream -vision to address his ow n concerns regarding 
the relationship of faith and reason. H e is also, however, clearly nodd ing  to 
classical perceptions of dream s as potential sources of w isdom  and prophecy. 
Characters such as the Fox, w ho encourage rationality in O rual to the exclusion 
of belief in Psyche's outrageous tale, cannot help bu t rem ind the reader of those 
Greek philosophers w ho objected to a belief in dream s as revelatory. If Plato 
believed that dream s were dependent on the psyche, Lewis seeks to redefine the 
psyche as som ething intrinsically supernatural and therefore som ething 
undeniably  linked w ith  a tru th  that can be accessed by dream s. Lewis draw s 
together the classical and m edieval, the rational and the faith-driven concepts of 
dream s and tru th  in a  Neo-Platonic retelling of the m yth  of C upid  and Psyche.
Though the second book of Till We Have Faces m ore explicitly thrusts 
O rual into the genre of the dream -vision, im itating m ore closely conventions that 
Lewis w ould  have encountered in m edieval texts, dream s and discussions of 
dream s overshadow  the first book as well. The culture of Glome seems to reflect 
that of the Greeks w ho believed in the supernatural natu re  of dream s. The Fox, 
as a  representative of the Greek philosophers, stands largely outside the culture, 
critical of w hat he considers superstitious beliefs, bu t also w illing to m ake use of 
them  w here it serves him. An exam ple of these respective positions is found 
w hen the king has agreed to sacrifice Psyche, bu t is irritated by the disapproval 
of Fox and Orual. H e asks w hat alternative is available to him: "W hat w ould  you 
do yourself, Fox, w ith  all your cleverness, if you w ere in m y place?" (58). The Fox 
responds w ith num erous suggestions, including the possibility of faking a vision, 
know ing that the priest m ight accept such a revelation for truth: "I'd say I'd been 
w arned in a dream  not to m ake the Great Offering till the new  m oon" (59). Fox,
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as indicated by his answer, understands that a dream  w ould  be acceptable 
evidence for the priest, bu t he also shows his ow n ultim ate reliance on w orldly 
reason, only offering the dream  as a m eans to gain tim e to think, rather than 
relying on it entirely.
Orual, as a native of Glome, is torn between reverence and disregard for 
dream s, due to the m inistrations of her tutor, the Fox. After she is queen, in her 
last years, she takes a tour th rough neighboring kingdom s and comes upon  a 
small tem ple dedicated to her sister Psyche. There she hears for the first tim e the 
m yth  that has grow n from  Psyche's story. She is appalled at m uch that she 
perceives as error and blam es the gods for creating and diffusing a false story as 
further torm ent to her: "So this was the shape the story h ad  taken. [...] H ow  
could any m ortal have know n of that palace at all? That m uch of the tru th  they 
had  dropped  into som eone's m ind, in a dream, or an oracle, or how ever they do 
such things" (243). O rual recognizes the real possibility of the gods 
com m unicating w ith  m en by w ay of dream s, bu t she evinces w hat skepticism 
and anger she can by rejecting the tru th  of such dreams, subscribing to a view 
that the gods are m anipulative, using  their pow ers for evil.
O rual's ambivalence tow ard dream s and her anger tow ard the gods 
stems from  her ow n former experiences w ith both in the first book. As Schakel 
says, dream s, in this novel, are connected to sight and the perception of reality 
(45). In the first book, dream s are m ost often m entioned as a m eans by w hich to 
grasp a difficult tru th  or to comfort one's self in bad  times, as stories and fictions 
as m uch as real events. The stories and fictions, the m eans by w hich to deny  the 
impossible, however, quickly become entw ined and confused w ith reality. 
D ream  and reality become interchangeable, and as such, equivalent. W hen Orual 
first encounters her sister after her sacrifice, she is eager for Psyche to tell her 
entire story. Psyche does so, explaining first of all her experience chained to the 
sacrificial tree before help came. She tells of the w ay in w hich she tried to comfort 
herself, falling back on her desire to live on the M ountain in a palace until this 
dream  failed her: "At first I w as try ing to cheer m yself w ith  all that old dream  of 
m y gold and am ber palace on the M ountain . . . and the god . . . try ing to believe 
it. But I cou ldn 't believe in it at all. I cou ldn 't understand  how  I ever had" (109). 
For Psyche in that instance, a dream  is som ething akin to a story, som ething she 
quickly believes to be only a fiction in the face of harsh  reality. W hen she finds in 
fact that her story is true, however, and that the god on the M ountain does exist, 
Psyche's story, in retrospect, is no t fiction at all. The dream  is at once both story 
and reality, both im agined and real, and, as a lim inal space, the dream  allows for 
this confusion.
Orual, however, is still dedicated to the idea of the dream  as a  fiction 
and therefore cannot b u t deny a crucial part of the dream 's natu re  and liminality. 
She can think of only one w ay at first to dissuade her sister from  her belief in the
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god of the w est-w ind: She asks "W ere you awake, Psyche?," im plying that such 
w onders are only found in dreams, calling on the same fictive natu re  of dream s 
as stories that Psyche herself references in the beginning of her tale (111). Psyche, 
however, has now  em braced the m ore com plete natu re  of the d ream —she can no 
longer retu rn  to her doubtful position enchained on the m ountain. She responds, 
"Oh, it was no dream . One can 't dream  things like that, because one's never seen 
things like that" (111). W hile it is seemingly true that Psyche could not have 
im agined the entire reality in w hich she now  lives, it is im possible to dism iss the 
fact that her childhood dream s w ere eerily accurate regarding her present fate, 
rendering her answer som ew hat self-contradictory if understood to dism iss her 
dream s entirely. It is m ore in accord w ith the novel as a whole to understand  
Psyche's answer as a rejection of her sister's definition of dream  as fictive and 
prom pted by the m ental state of the dream er. Rather, Psyche has rejected the 
fragm entation of dream  and reality, a distinction of definition that O rual is yet 
incapable of understanding. Lewis expresses a sim ilar sentim ent regarding 
prayer and the existence of God in his poem, "Prayer." W hile pain ting  first a 
picture of the m ockery received for p ray ing—"O ne talker aping tw o" —Lewis 
subverts this m ockery to paint instead a reality. Indeed, there is only One, but 
that One is God: "thus w hile we seem / Two talking, thou art One forever, and I / 
No dream er, bu t thy  dream " (ll. 4, 14-16). W hat was Psyche's dream  is instead 
that of the god of the M ountain, and that, instead of dream , is reality.
Given her state of non-enlightenm ent, O rual is not satisfied w ith 
Psyche's response. She repeats "You m ust have been dream ing!" (112). Since it is 
later m ade clear that Psyche is indeed telling the truth, O rual's insistence on 
classifying the tru th  of the gods as dream  sets u p  a definition of reality as dream  
w hile the two states of being become less distinct. Psyche em phasizes this in the 
very same page: "And if it was a dream , Sister, how  do you think I came here? 
It's  m ore likely everything that had  happened  to m e before this w as a dream. 
W hy, Glome and the King and old Batta seem to m e very like dream s now " 
(112). If reality can be classified as dream, and if dream  is no longer recognized 
as such, b u t as reality, O rual finds herself som ew hat lost w ithout the know ledge 
to w hich Psyche has access. The reality of Psyche before her becomes as a dream  
in the face of some greater reality O rual cannot yet believe as Lewis engages in a 
Neo-Platonic description. U sing dream  again as a w ay to explain her position, 
Psyche describes her experience in her husband 's  house: "D on 't you think a 
dream  w ould  feel shy if it were seen w alking about in the w aking w orld?" (114­
15). O rual also considers Psyche dream-like, bu t for the opposite reason. She has 
departed  from  the w orld  that O rual know s as real: "Yes . . . oh, m y ow n child—I 
do feel y o u —I hold  you. But o h —it's only like holding you in a dream . You are 
leagues away" (121). If O rual could em brace the dream  as reality, she could m ore 
firm ly em brace her sister, bu t she cannot yet do so. W hen she cannot at first
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convince Psyche to leave w ith her and abandon w hat she considers delusion, 
O rual struggles about w hether to try  further. She w onders if she should not 
"leave her to that fool-happy dream ," of w hich O rual clearly feels she has no part 
(152). Despite her general disbelief in Psyche's story, attributing it to m adness, 
she also recognizes the comfort and real sustenance Psyche takes from  it. She 
cannot entirely ignore that her sister is healthy and looks well; in fact, looks m ore 
real than she ever has before.
W hen she successfully convinces Psyche to test the reality of her 
husband, the dream -w orld is shattered, bu t at the same time, O rual is given 
visual proof of the god 's existence. The proof, though, is offered under 
circumstances considerably dream-like. O rual awakes from  w hat she believes 
m ust have been a faint and becomes lost in thought w hile w aiting for the lights 
that will signal that Psyche is finding out the true natu re  of her husband. At one 
point, she finds herself bew ailing the cruelty of her sister and reproves herself for 
"falling back to the dream s of m y sickness" (170). U nder these circumstances, 
O rual experiences the flood and the chaos and the god, her sister's husband. She 
goes out in search of her sister, bu t w hen day breaks, cannot rem em ber the rest 
of her n igh t (174). She is afraid, also, to tell the Fox of the god, for fear he will 
think her dreaming: "There was no use in telling h im  about the god; he w ould  
have thought I had  been m ad or dream ing" (178). Again, dream ing is held in 
contrast to truth, reality, and san ity—in contrast to reason. D ream ing is relegated 
to the realm s of faith and revelation, and, w henever O rual is in contact w ith  the 
gods, she associates that contact w ith dream, consigning the gods to the realm s 
of faith and revelation alone. Even w hen she hears the priest of her sister's 
tem ple tell the "false" story of Psyche's path  to imm ortality, she is roused from  a 
"dream like feeling" that the tem ple has aw akened in her (243). M ost of the novel 
is thus taken up  w ith O rual's torture considering her lack of know ledge or belief 
concerning the reality of her sister's condition. Lewis clearly connects her 
uncertainty w ith her inability to believe or accept dream s as tru th  in the w ay that 
Psyche has. The dream s are, in fact, a key to the reality of the story w herever they 
appear. O rual's dream s in her sickness are a surer indicator of her feelings than 
her ow n reasoned expression of them, in the same w ay that Psyche's palace and 
her god are real.
As O rual attem pts to leave behind Psyche's sufferings and pursue her 
role as queen w ith all her strength, she cannot avoid recalling her sister, 
sometim es in jealousy. H er ow n jealousy frightens her, recalling to her m ind the 
sickness she suffered after Psyche was sacrificed to the Beast: "For it began to be 
like those vile dream s I had  had  in m y ravings w hen the cruel gods p u t into m y 
m ind  the horrible m ad fancy that it was Psyche w ho was m y enem y" (200). She is 
repelled by this idea, insisting that she loves Psyche above all else. The dreams, 
however, are proven som ew hat true by O rual's realization in the second book
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that her actions tow ards Psyche at the last w ere not from  love. The novel 
reinforces the role of dream s as tru th-bearers yet again, and it is only w hen O rual 
is able to accept the tru th  of her dream s that she can tru ly  understand  her sister's 
fate and im prove her own.
O rual repeats the phrase v ile  d rea m  w hen she is startled by the new  
priest now  w earing the old priest's garbs: "H e w ore the skins and bladders, the 
bird-m ask hung  at his chest. The sight of all that gave me a sudden shock, like a 
vile dream, forgotten on w aking bu t suddenly  rem em bered at noon" (205). Long 
disgusted by the priest's garb, the sight of them  rem inds her of the old priest and 
his air of holiness. W hen she com prehends that it is "only Arnom ," the new  
priest, however, she relaxes: "H e w ould  never be terrible like the old Priest" 
(205). Yet again, though, in the second book, O rual recognizes that A rnom 's m ore 
rational and tem pered approach to U ngit is not fully satisfactory. W hat seems a 
dream  is often a signal of tru th  w ithin the novel, and O rual is forced to confront 
the value of the blood and sacrifice associated w ith  Ungit. In the second book she 
watches an old w om an bypass the new er Greek-style statue of U ngit (parallel 
w ith  A rnom 's new  style of worship) to w orship the old stone that has long stood 
as Ungit: "She looked as if she had  cried all night, and in her hands she held  a 
live pigeon. One of the lesser priests came forw ard at once, took the tiny offering 
from  her, slit it open w ith his stone knife, splashed the little shower of blood over 
U ngit [...]. The trouble was soothed" (271-2).
O rual ends the first book, though, still thoroughly convinced that she is 
right in her com plaint against the gods. She is a w om an w ho clings to reason, 
dedicating her w riting to the Greeks, and indulging in the Fox's philosophy. So, 
the end of the first book is the w ork of a w om an setting out a logical court case 
rather than a m em oir or narrative. She sets out a series of evidences of the gods' 
w rongdoing and ends w ith  a "therefore" conclusion. She enjoins her readers to 
judge her case based upon  the following evidence:
They gave me nothing in the world to love but Psyche and then took her 
from me. But that was not enough. They then brought me to her at such a 
place and time that it hung on my w ord whether she should continue in 
bliss or be cast out into misery. They would not tell me whether she was 
the bride of a god, or mad, or a brute's or villain's spoil. They would give 
no clear sign, though I begged for it. I had to guess. And because I guessed 
wrong they punished m e—w hat's worse, punished me through her. And 
even that was not enough; they have now sent out a lying story in which I 
was given no riddle to guess, but knew and saw that she was the god's 
bride, and of my own will destroyed her, and that for jealousy. As if I were 
another Redival. I say the gods deal very unrightly w ith us. For they will 
neither (which would be best of all) go away and leave us to live our own
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short days to ourselves, nor will they show themselves openly and tell us 
what they would have us do. [...]
I say, therefore, that there is no creature (toad, scorpion, or serpent) so 
noxious to m an as the gods. (249)
O rual carefully constructs her evidence against the gods, piling crime 
upon  crime. The gods not only stole her sister, bu t blam e her for the loss. They 
spread false stories about her. They tease mortals. H er conclusion is, then, that 
the gods hate men. They have harried  her because it is their nature, not because 
she has deserved it. O rual's tone comes across as defensive, excusing herself 
from  blame, as if she fears a higher logic and a higher voice. Then, rather than 
letting her readers tru ly  judge for them selves from  this evidence, she 
presupposes that the gods cannot answer her charge: "It m ay well be that, 
instead of answering, they'll strike m e m ad or leprous or tu rn  m e into beast, bird, 
or tree. But will not all the w orld then know  (and the gods will know  it knows) 
that this is because they have no answer?" (250).
The second book is essentially the gods' answer to the first. The answer 
comes about through O rual's reconsideration of her first narrative and m ore than 
one dream-vision. At the very beginning, O rual cites her actual w riting process 
as the first step tow ard illumination: "W hat began the change was the very 
w riting itself. Let no one lightly set about such a w ork" (253). It is the w riting 
w hich readies O rual for the upcom ing conviction and transform ation: "The 
change w hich the w riting w rought in m e [...] was only a b e g in n in g -o n ly  to 
prepare m e for the gods' surgery. They used m y ow n pen to probe m y w ound" 
(253-54). This m etaphor is one that resonates w ith both classical and m edieval 
dream-visions. In the m edieval text De Planctu Naturae, Lynch explains, Alain de 
Lille w rites of N atura aiding the Dreamer, appearing like a physician suited to 
help him  (80). James Gollnick also records a m ore literal sense of the m etaphor 
for a classical audience. Inside the dream  incubation temples, there w ere m any 
inscriptions that w rote of a "god perform ing surgery on the patient" (32).
This traditional m etaphor ties together classical and m edieval dream - 
vision philosophy w ithin Till We Have Faces. Am brosius Aurelius Theodsius 
M acrobius, w riting tw o to three centuries after A puleius and the height of the 
dream  incubation temples, com piled a classification system  for dreams, 
identifying five different kinds of d re a m s - th e  enigmatic, the prophetic, the 
oracular, the nightm are, and the apparition (Macrobius 88). The enigmatic 
dream , or somnium, is defined as "one that conceals w ith strange shapes and veils 
w ith  am biguity the true m eaning of the inform ation being offered, and requires 
an interpretation for its understanding" (Macrobius 90). C.S. Lewis redefines 
M acrobius's definition: "This shows us tru ths veiled in an allegorical form. [. . .] 
Every allegorical dream -poem  in the M iddle Ages records a feigned somnium.
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N early all dream s are assum ed to be so m n ia  by m odern  psychologists" (D isca rd ed  
63-4). The dream s that O rual experiences in the second book are s o m n ia — 
populated  by  strange landscapes and dead souls, and O rual needs both her 
father and the Fox as her guides.
But as so m n ia , O rual's dream s also fit w ithin the classification of the 
religious and allegorical dream  vision of the M iddle Ages. The religious dream - 
vision is usually  a first-person narrative, though some have been narrated  to 
scribes, and, very often, they reflect a sophisticated hand ling  of C hurch doctrine 
or provide insight into that doctrine. O ther times, they provide emotional, even 
physical, solace. Often, God or a close representative speaks personally to the 
narrator. The allegorical dream -vision, build ing on some of these same 
conventions, also has a first-person narrator, though almost always asleep and 
dream ing, b u t the guide is usually  an allegorical figu re—for example, Reason or 
N ature. The topic of the allegorical vision is usually  rom ance or love. As will be 
seen, O rual's visions combine elem ents of both as she pursues divine wisdom.
The first dream  that O rual records in Book II appears to be a mix 
betw een an in s o m n iu m  (nightmare) and a s o m n iu m . The nightm are, as Lewis 
explains it, "m erely repeats w orking preoccupations" (D isca rd ed  64). For Orual, 
this first dream  reflects her obsession w ith  "separating  m otive from  m otive and 
both from  pretext" w ithin her accusation of the gods, bu t it u ltim ately parallels 
the actions of her sister as well (256). The dream  is m ore than a m ere reflection of 
her everyday tasks, an in s o m n iu m ; it provides a tru th  not yet understood.
Later, O rual experiences her first s o m n iu m . R eturning from  the 
celebration of the Year's birth, she goes to her chamber to rest and think. She 
does not record going to sleep, instead saying "I sank into deep thought" (273). 
The next th ing she know s she is opening her eyes to see her dead father. This 
now  is the s o m n iu m  as her father leads her th rough a series of allegorical motions. 
As she sets eyes on the old King, she feels as if her "queenship shrank u p  small 
like a dream " (273). The boundary  between dream  and reality is again blurred. 
H um bled, she obeys her father as he orders her into the Pillar Room w here they 
dig a hole in the paved floor. In a smaller and w arm er earthen replica of the 
room  above, they dig yet another hole to fall to a rock replica. H er father informs 
her that "There's no Fox to help you here. [...] W e're far below  any dens that 
foxes can dig" (275). The Fox, O rual's form er tutor, is also her representative of 
Reason. Still scared and defensive tow ard the gods, O rual views this dream  as 
one that deprives her of prized rationality.
In the last room, the stone one, the King drags O rual to a m irror and 
forces her to look at her reflection for the first tim e in m any years. There, she sees 
herself as Ungit, "that all-devouring womblike, yet barren, thing. Glome w as a 
w eb —I the swollen spider, squat at its center, gorged w ith m en 's stolen lives" 
(276). This dream  is primal, earthy, like Ungit. It is revelation at its harshest—
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O rual sees herself full in her failings. She wakes to find that she has indeed been 
in a dream  though she "m ust give w arning that from  this tim e onw ard they so 
drenched m e w ith seeings that I cannot well discern dream  from  w aking nor tell 
w hich is truer" (276). The rest of the narrative is so m ixed betw een dream  and 
w aking that the tenuous boundaries between reality and dream  are u tterly  
destroyed: in this state all dichotomies can be shattered and reason and faith can 
m erge as one. In this new  state of religion, O rual can thrive w ithout fear. It is her 
experience in the dream  visions that allow her to m erge her ow n se lf- ra tio n a l 
and yet ultim ately U n g it- lik e -w ith  the faith and beauty  of Psyche.
O n w aking w ith fear from  this first proper vision, O rual realizes there is 
no escaping its truth: "This vision, anyway, allowed no denial" (276). A nd as she 
accepts the fact that m ore and m ore of her life is overshadow ed by dream s and 
visions, she recognizes the lim inal state she has entered. Yet m ore im portantly, 
she grows comfortable w ith this strange space, questioning the true difference 
betw een reality and dream:
"Of the things that followed I cannot at all say whether they were what 
m en call real or what men call dream. And for all I can tell, the only 
difference is that what many see we call a real thing, and what only one 
sees we call a dream. But things that many see may have no taste or 
moment in them at all, and things that are shown only to one may be 
spears and water-spouts of tru th  from the very depth of truth." (277)
O rual is w illing to accept the dream s as tru th  and so is one step closer to Psyche. 
This passage also foreshadow s the m erging of faith and reason as dream  and 
reality lose definition as actual separate elem ents and gain a new  definition as a 
com posite whole; the dichotom y between them  is one of m ere perspective.
In her next vision, O rual is less definitive on the vision's status as a 
dream: "About this tim e there came (if you call it so) another dream . But it was 
not like a dream , for I w ent into m y cham ber an hour after noon (none of m y 
w om en being there) and w ithout lying down, or even sitting down, walked 
straight into the vision by m erely opening the door" (283). The detail w ith which 
O rual describes her position upon  entering the vision echoes the w ords of 
m edieval dream ers like Julian of N orw ich w ho take tim e to describe their 
physical state upon  G od's visitation: "So I lasted un til day, and by  then m y body 
w as dead from  the m iddle dow nw ards, as it felt to me. [...] After that I felt as if 
the u pper p art of m y body were beginning to die. [< ]  A nd suddenly  it came into 
m y m ind  that I ought to w ish" (Julian 127-8). O rual's vision, of course, is not of 
the cross b u t of a flock of ram s from  w hich she w ants to pluck some gold wool
(283). She is tram pled, though, by  their m ad  dash. It is only later that she finds 
out her pain  w ith in  this vision enabled her sister to com plete her tasks for U ngit 
and obtain her freedom. Because she does not yet understand  its purpose, O rual
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responds in despair, decrying the Divine N ature that hu rts  w ithout consideration
(284) . She also gives u p  hope of losing her Ungit-like nature (284).
Finally, w hen O rual can find no comfort to cling to other than the 
thought that she cared tru ly  for Psyche if no one else, her last vision comes. It is 
one that tears dow n her last bastions of self-defense and finally opens her to the 
true possibilities of faith in the divine. It is a vision rem oved entirely from  the 
realm  of dream , closer to the w ide-awake visions of Julian: "W hat followed was 
certainly vision and no dream. For it came upon  m e before I had  sat dow n or 
unrolled  the book. I w alked into the vision w ith  m y bodily eyes w ide open"
(285) . H er visions in trude m ore vividly into the w aking w orld, fusing dream  and 
reality, im agination and reason as O rual approaches her final answer. W ithin this 
vision, her case is to be heard, the logic of her com plaint at the end of the first 
book examined.
O rual is forced to stand naked in front of a crowd of the dead, including 
both her father and the Fox. H er book is her only defense against the eyes upon 
her and she finds that it, too, has grow n pitiably small: "And too o ld —a little 
shabby, crum pled thing, nothing like m y great book tha t I h ad  w orked on all 
day, day after day, while Bardia was dying" (289). She finds the logic w ithin the 
book less than com pelling and refuses to believe that it is tru ly  hers: "It w as all a 
vile scribble—each stroke m ean and yet savage, like the snarl in m y father's 
voice, like the ruinous faces one could m ake out in the U ngit stone" (290). She 
reads it anyw ays and is shocked at the tru th  of her com plain t—a repetitious and 
vengeful diatribe tha t reveals her ow n selfishness to possess even Psyche as her 
own. She is ordered to stop and w hen asked if she is answered, she replies 
sim ply "Yes" (293). H er logic is overcome by yet a greater one.
U pon the realization of her true voice, her true face, O rual is abashed. 
H er father's spirit offers to teach her a lesson, b u t the Fox intervenes. H e seeks to 
defend her before the judge, blam ing her faults on his ow n over-em phasis on 
reason rather than on the poets and the dark theology of U ngit (295). Enlightened 
as to his ow n over-dependence on reason, the Fox still stands as a wise figure, 
explaining to O rual the m istakes of the poets regarding the afterlife and serving 
as her guide; he is very m uch placed in the novel like the figure of Reason or 
Philosophy in the allegorical visions of the M iddle Ages.2 H is identity  as the 
representative of Greek w isdom  (tem pered now  by the know ledge gained after 
death) m akes the Fox the perfect character to explain aw ay O rual's confusion
2 As one of the foundational dream-visions for medieval thinkers, for example, though 
classical in nature, De Consolatione Philosophiae by Boethius features the visit of Lady 
Philosophy to the imprisoned author. She leads her student to remember the philosophy he 
has learned before and to find some contentment in his situation through an understanding 
of true happiness. Lewis ranked Boethius's dream-vision as "one of the most influential 
books ever written in Latin" (Discarded 75).
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regarding w hat she has seen before in her dream s. H e leads her to a chamber 
w ith  pain ted  walls that depict the m yth  of Psyche.
As O rual watches the history of her sister's tasks, she realizes it is she 
w ho has suffered the pains while Psyche has reaped the benefits of her actions. 
W hen the Fox queries if she h ad  rather have had  justice, she protests: "W ould 
you mock me, G randfather? Justice? Oh, I've been a queen and I know  the 
people's cry for justice m ust be heard. But not m y cry" (301). O rual's statem ent 
nullifies the ending of the first book and her extrem ely logical, yet ultim ately 
fallacious, argum ent. Yet as the Fox guides her through the pictures and to her 
u ltim ate trial at the hand  of Psyche's husband, the god of the M ountain, 
som ething else awaits Orual: an answer.
The question that needs answ ered is one that has been proposed by 
O rual in her w aking life to the priest Arnom . Still confused about the gods, and 
bitter about their secrecy that she blam es for her ow n actions, she tries to learn of 
their nature from  the priest: "'Arnom ,' said I, w hispering, 'w ho  is Ungit?'" (270). 
The priest answers, as O rual reports, in a w ay quite different from  his 
predecessors, influenced as he has been by the Fox: "This was the new  w ay of 
talking about the gods w hich Arnom, and others, had  learned from  the Fox" — 
the Fox, the symbol of reason w ithin the novel (270-71). H is answer, then, is one 
of carefully constructed m etaphor, reason 's w ay of explaining the goddess's 
com plicated role: "[Ungit] signifies the earth, w hich is the womb and m other of 
all living things" (270). O rual is still not satisfied w ith  his answer and holds an 
extended dialogue w ith the priest that highlights her concerns:
"If she is the mother of all things," said I, "in what way more is she 
the mother of the god of the Mountain?"
"He is the air and the sky, for we see the clouds coming up from the 
earth in mists and exhalations."
"Then why do stories sometimes say he's her husband, too?"
"That means that the sky by its showers makes the earth fruitful."
"If that's all they mean, why do they wrap it up in so strange a 
fashion?"
"Doubtless," said Arnom (and I could tell that he was yawning 
inside the mask, being w orn out w ith his vigil), "doubtless to hide it from 
the vulgar."
I would torment him no more, but I said to myself, "It's very strange 
that our fathers should first think it worth telling us that rain falls out of 
the sky, and then, for fear such a notable secret should get out (why not 
hold their tongues?) wrap it up in a filthy tale so that no one could 
understand the telling." (271)
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O rual's discussion w ith  the priest is set up  very m uch like the question 
and answer form at that Julian of N orw ich and other m edieval religious w riters 
use in their work: creating questions for the audience so that reason m ight 
explain. The discussion also reflects a Platonic dialogue in w hich the tru th  can 
only be reached by  m eans of constant questioning, breaching boundaries and 
traditions (Gallagher 145).3 Orual, however, show ed a disregard for Platonic and 
Socratic reasoning earlier in the novel by her flippant treatm ent of the Socratic 
dialogues included in her eighteen-book library (Lewis, T W H F  232; M yers 71). 
Despite O rual's resistance to these form s of acquiring knowledge, Lewis has 
clearly set them  up  as necessary paths by w hich to achieve understanding. Both 
m edieval and classical allusions also set up  an argum ent for the im portance of 
reason in religion, and A rnom  implies in the conversation that religion is not for 
the feeble-minded, b u t rather for those w ho can discern the tru th  w ithin the 
s to ry -m u c h  like Jesus's explanation of the parables to his disciples: "W ho hath  
ears to hear, let h im  hear" (M atthew 13:9). Orual, at this point, cannot accept this 
reasoning. By alluding to classical m yth  in his novel, however, Lewis is judging 
this lack on O rual's part. The m yth, according to Lewis, is an attem pt to convey 
some "num inous" value, and hum ans cannot help bu t to allegorize it and find 
im portance in it (A n  E x p e r im e n t in  C r itic ism  44). A rnom 's explanation also 
presages the eventual m erging of O rual w ith her sister Psyche. The god of the 
M ountain is both husband  and son; in G lom e's religion (and by extension of the 
m etaphor, Christianity) there is little boundary, little division between roles. 
O rual m ust learn to accept, in a similar m anner, that reason is not only the cold 
logic critiquing the m yth, bu t the logic used w ithin and expected by the m yth  as 
well, the reason coupled w ith faith that the gods know  w hat they're about. It is 
then that her soul will be complete, and that she too will be Psyche.
The question that O rual poses the priest is of one piece w ith  her 
bitterness tow ard the gods. The priest's answer does not satisfy her or her 
complaint. However, in her dream  vision she is far m ore am enable to answers. 
A sham ed and appalled at her presentation before the judge in the underw orld  
and led to understand  the relation betw een her and Psyche during  their long 
absence, O rual is now  receptive, led to this point by  the reason she prizes. She, 
the student of reason, enters the courtyard of the god of the M ountain. There she 
m eets Psyche yet again, w ho has never lost her faith in the face of adversity. 
Psyche hands her the casket of beauty, the result of her last set task: "You know  I 
w ent a long journey to fetch the beauty  that will m ake U ngit beautiful" (305-06).
3 Gallagher also explains the way in which Hans-Georg Gadamer extends on this concept 
of Platonic dialogue, saying that the dialogue cannot end until the question no longer 
exists. This, in some ways, reflects the ending of Till W e Have Faces in which the question no 
longer exists—or potentially never has existed, so fulfilling is the answer (145).
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O rual also has traveled this long journey and she is now  fit to receive Psyche's 
gift.
Finally reunited, Psyche and O rual w ait in eager anticipation for the 
god, Psyche's husband, to return  to his house. At his approach, Orual 
experiences an entirely new  sensation: "The air was grow ing brighter and 
brighter about us; as if som ething had  set it on fire. Each breath I drew  let into 
m e new  terror, joy, overpow ering sweetness. I was pierced through and through 
w ith  the arrows of it. I was being unm ade" (307). It is by the process of breaking 
boundaries, as O rual's physical boundary  from the w orld  and her sister—her 
b o d y —is perforated, that O rual is rem ade. She is both unm ade and a new  
person; she is, in some ways, both real and a fiction. Reason is pierced by faith 
and faith rejuvenates reason. All that terrified her before, O rual now  accepts 
despite the fear. As a result of this change, this m erging, O rual sees herself as a 
different person. She is Psyche and yet not exactly alike. She has become a new  
and complete soul: "Two figures, reflections, their feet to Psyche's feet and mine, 
stood head  dow nw ard in the water. But whose were they? Two Psyches, the one 
clothed, the other naked? Yes, both Psyches, both beautiful (if that m attered  now) 
beyond all imagining, yet not exactly the same" (307-08).
Reason and faith are different, yet they are not separate. O rual is still 
Psyche, if slightly different, as the god declares: "You also are Psyche" (308). 
Reason is also p art of the soul, p art of religion, bu t it m ust be fully integrated and 
entw ined w ith  faith. It is at this declaration, this ultim ate m om ent of tru th  that 
the vision ends: "I looked u p  then, and it's  strange that I dared. But I saw  no god, 
no pillared court. I was in the palace gardens, m y foolish book in m y hand. The 
vision to the eye had, I think, faded one m om ent before the oracle to the ear. For 
the w ords w ere still sounding" (308). O rual awakes in a garden, a trope of the 
allegorical dream -vision and, having reached this point of truth, O rual has little 
else to say. She reports that she is near death and ends w ith  a brief reflection.
The last paragraph  of her narrative portrays the god of the M ountain as 
the final end to reason, the be-all answer to the m ind 's  desire for reason. H e does 
not quench reason, bu t fulfills. She addresses the Lord directly now  too. The 
dream  vision has served as the bridge betw een her soul and the god 's. H er tone 
echoes again the voice of Julian of N orw ich and the mystic experience. Julian 
w rites in her eighty-fifth chapter, the last before she addresses her readers 
directly: "And then shall none of u s be m oved to say in any matter: Lord, if it had  
been so, it w ould  have been well. But we shall all say w ith one voice: Lord, 
blessed m ay you be, because it is so, it is well; and now  we see tru ly  that 
everything is done as it was ordained by you before anything was m ade" (341). 
O rual also now  views her Lord as both the beginning and the end, preceding the 
question and anticipating the answer: "I ended m y first book w ith  the w ords no 
answer. I know  now, Lord, w hy you u tte r no answer. You are yourself the
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answer. Before your face questions die away. W hat other answ er w ould  suffice? 
Only words, words; to be led out to battle against other w ords" (308).
Reason seeks ultim ately an answer, the end to an eager and inquiring 
question, and O rual's god em bodies this answ er beyond the m ere level of words. 
All reason is contained w ithin him . H er dream  visions allow O rual to u nderstand  
and accept this point, to reconcile her rational self w ith  faith. She values her 
dream  vision as w isdom  enough to send to the Greeks, from  w hich the Fox and 
her representative of logic came, and entrusts A rnom  w ith  the task to give her 
book to any traveler that m ay take it to Greece (309). H er questions answered, 
she, herself, will not live m uch longer: "The old body will not stand m any m ore 
such seeings" (308).
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